Silicon Statecraft Alignment: Taiwan’s Strategic Bet on US-Led Export Controls
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| Опубликовано в:: | The Diplomat (Jul 1, 2025) |
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| Главный автор: | |
| Опубликовано: |
Tribune Content Agency LLC
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | Citation/Abstract Full Text |
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| 045 | 0 | |b d20250701 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Ching-Fu Lin and Han-Wei Liu | |
| 245 | 1 | |a Silicon Statecraft Alignment: Taiwan’s Strategic Bet on US-Led Export Controls | |
| 260 | |b Tribune Content Agency LLC |c Jul 1, 2025 | ||
| 513 | |a News | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a Taiwan’s export control regime is becoming more closely aligned with U.S. policy, recalibrating its role in an emerging U.S.-anchored system of networked chokepoint statecraft. Since 2018, the United States – citing national security threats – has pursued aggressive measures to constrain China’s access to cutting-edge technologies. In August 2020, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) expanded the Foreign Direct Product Rule under the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA)/Export Administration Regulations (EAR) regime, requiring Taiwanese firms and others at key supply chain chokepoints to comply with the tightened U.S. controls. The extraterritorial rules operate on the principle that any foreign-made chip becomes subject to U.S. laws if it is the direct product of U.S. technology, software, or equipment – extending U.S. export controls deep into global semiconductor supply chains. In practice, enforcement gaps have persisted, driven partly by the lack of coordination between the U.S. and other chokepoint economies amid supply chain complexity, insufficient law enforcement and compliance, shifting technologies, and competing interests even within the network of “like-minded countries.” | |
| 610 | 4 | |a NVidia Corp | |
| 651 | 4 | |a United States--US | |
| 651 | 4 | |a China | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Taiwan | |
| 653 | |a Geopolitics | ||
| 653 | |a Law enforcement | ||
| 653 | |a National security | ||
| 653 | |a Semiconductors | ||
| 653 | |a Tariffs | ||
| 653 | |a Fines & penalties | ||
| 653 | |a International trade | ||
| 653 | |a Due diligence | ||
| 653 | |a Supply chains | ||
| 653 | |a Licensing | ||
| 653 | |a Extraterritoriality | ||
| 653 | |a Compliance | ||
| 653 | |a Export controls | ||
| 773 | 0 | |t The Diplomat |g (Jul 1, 2025) | |
| 786 | 0 | |d ProQuest |t Political Science Database | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |3 Citation/Abstract |u https://www.proquest.com/docview/3225840369/abstract/embedded/7BTGNMKEMPT1V9Z2?source=fedsrch |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |3 Full Text |u https://www.proquest.com/docview/3225840369/fulltext/embedded/7BTGNMKEMPT1V9Z2?source=fedsrch |