A Study on the Evolution Game of Multi-Subject Knowledge Sharing Behavior in Open Innovation Ecosystems

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Publicado en:Systems vol. 13, no. 7 (2025), p. 511-536
Autor principal: Zhang Gupeng
Otros Autores: Zou Hua, Yang, Shuo, Hou Qiang
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MDPI AG
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024 7 |a 10.3390/systems13070511  |2 doi 
035 |a 3233253113 
045 2 |b d20250101  |b d20251231 
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100 1 |a Zhang Gupeng  |u School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China; zgp1761249699@163.com (G.Z.); 
245 1 |a A Study on the Evolution Game of Multi-Subject Knowledge Sharing Behavior in Open Innovation Ecosystems 
260 |b MDPI AG  |c 2025 
513 |a Journal Article 
520 3 |a With the shift of the global innovation model from traditional closed-loop to open ecosystems, knowledge sharing and collaborative cooperation among firms have become key to obtaining sustainable competitive advantages. However, existing studies mostly focus on the static structure, and there is an insufficient exploration of the dynamic evolutionary mechanism and multi-party game strategies. In this paper, a two-dimensional analysis framework integrating the evolutionary game and the Lotka–Volterra model is constructed to explore the behavioral and strategic evolution of core enterprises, SMEs and the government in the innovation ecosystem. Through theoretical modeling and numerical simulation, the effects of different variables on system stability are revealed. It is found that a moderately balanced benefit allocation can stimulate two-way knowledge sharing, while an over- or under-allocation ratio will inhibit the synergy efficiency of the system; a moderate difference in the knowledge stock can promote knowledge complementarity, but an over-concentration will lead to the monopoly and closure of the system; and the government subsidy needs to accurately match the cost of the openness of the enterprises with the potential benefits to the society, so as to avoid the incentive from being unused. Accordingly, it is suggested to optimize the competition structure among enterprises through the dynamic benefit distribution mechanism, knowledge sharing platform construction and classification subsidy policy, promote the evolution of the innovation ecosystem to a balanced state of mutual benefit and symbiosis, and provide theoretical basis and practical inspiration for the governance of the open innovation ecosystem. 
653 |a Ecology 
653 |a Innovations 
653 |a Game theory 
653 |a Evolution 
653 |a Collaboration 
653 |a Games 
653 |a Tacit knowledge 
653 |a Knowledge sharing 
653 |a Decision making 
653 |a Knowledge management 
653 |a Small & medium sized enterprises-SME 
653 |a Two dimensional analysis 
653 |a Closed loops 
653 |a Symbiosis 
653 |a Systems stability 
653 |a Business ecosystems 
653 |a Competition 
653 |a Subsidies 
700 1 |a Zou Hua  |u School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China; zgp1761249699@163.com (G.Z.); 
700 1 |a Yang, Shuo  |u Economic Research Institute, Stat Grid Liaoning Electric Power Company Limited, Shenyang 110870, China 
700 1 |a Hou Qiang  |u School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology, Shenyang 110870, China; zgp1761249699@163.com (G.Z.); 
773 0 |t Systems  |g vol. 13, no. 7 (2025), p. 511-536 
786 0 |d ProQuest  |t Advanced Technologies & Aerospace Database 
856 4 1 |3 Citation/Abstract  |u https://www.proquest.com/docview/3233253113/abstract/embedded/6A8EOT78XXH2IG52?source=fedsrch 
856 4 0 |3 Full Text + Graphics  |u https://www.proquest.com/docview/3233253113/fulltextwithgraphics/embedded/6A8EOT78XXH2IG52?source=fedsrch 
856 4 0 |3 Full Text - PDF  |u https://www.proquest.com/docview/3233253113/fulltextPDF/embedded/6A8EOT78XXH2IG52?source=fedsrch