Lessons for Antitrust from the Capital One-Discover Merger: Is There a Subprime Market in Credit Cards?

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I whakaputaina i:Banking & Financial Services Policy Report vol. 44, no. 11 (Nov 2025), p. 1-11
Kaituhi matua: Zywicki, Todd
Ētahi atu kaituhi: Morris, Julian, Fruits, Eric, Sperry, Ben
I whakaputaina:
Aspen Publishers, Inc.
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100 1 |a Zywicki, Todd 
245 1 |a Lessons for Antitrust from the Capital One-Discover Merger: Is There a Subprime Market in Credit Cards? 
260 |b Aspen Publishers, Inc.  |c Nov 2025 
513 |a Feature 
520 3 |a In April 2025, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency cleared the proposed $35 billion merger of Capital One and Discover Bank, making the combined company the third-largest credit card issuers by volume. Because of the highly decentralized nature of the US. credit card industry, the merger typically would draw minimal regulatory scrutiny. Because of the significant market share of the two entities in the so-called subprime credit card market, however, the merger presented a novel question at the intersection of competition policy and consumer financial services- whether the subprime market should be analyzed as a separate market for antitrust purposes. According to one estimate the combined entity will have approximately 30% of the subprime market at the time the merger is consummated. The OCC did not specifically address whether there was a subprime market that should be treated as a separate market for purposes of analyzing the effect on consumers and competition. We agree with that analysis. Although the term subprime is used colloquially, defining a subprime market lacks a determinate and stable definition for purposes of rigorous antitrust analysis. Moreover, consumers who participate in the subprime market are subject to constant change and turnover, moving frequently between the subprime and prime markets. Finally, given the permeability of any demarcation between prime and subprime consumers, other large credit card issuers already have a presence in the subprime market and could easily expand their existing operations if Capital One-Discover attempted to increase prices for consumers. 
610 4 |a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fair Isaac Corp Federal Reserve Board Capital One Financial Corp Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Discover Bank 
651 4 |a United States--US 
653 |a Government agencies 
653 |a Antitrust 
653 |a Bank acquisitions & mergers 
653 |a Comptrollers 
653 |a Credit card industry 
653 |a Consumers 
653 |a Competition policy 
653 |a Credit scoring 
653 |a Credit card processing 
653 |a Financial services 
653 |a Subprime lending 
653 |a Market shares 
700 1 |a Morris, Julian 
700 1 |a Fruits, Eric 
700 1 |a Sperry, Ben 
773 0 |t Banking & Financial Services Policy Report  |g vol. 44, no. 11 (Nov 2025), p. 1-11 
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