Consistency in one-sided assignment problems
Guardado en:
| Publicado en: | Social Choice and Welfare vol. 35, no. 3 (Sep 2010), p. 415 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Otros Autores: | |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature B.V.
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Citation/Abstract Full Text Full Text - PDF |
| Etiquetas: |
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nab a2200000uu 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 746322023 | ||
| 003 | UK-CbPIL | ||
| 022 | |a 0176-1714 | ||
| 022 | |a 1432-217X | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1007/s00355-010-0447-8 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a 746322023 | ||
| 045 | 2 | |b d20100901 |b d20100930 | |
| 084 | |a 65742 |2 nlm | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Klaus, Bettina | |
| 245 | 1 | |a Consistency in one-sided assignment problems | |
| 260 | |b Springer Nature B.V. |c Sep 2010 | ||
| 513 | |a Feature | ||
| 520 | 3 | |a One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the division of payoffs to agents is flexible as part of the solution. We take a similar approach to one-sided assignment problems as Sasaki (Int J Game Theory 24:373-397, 1995) for two-sided assignment problems, and we analyze various desirable properties of solutions including consistency and weak pairwise-monotonicity. We show that for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems (i.e., the subset of one-sided assignment problems with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [Pareto indifference and consistency] or [invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2). However, we also prove that on the class of all one-sided assignment problems (solvable or not), no solution satisfies consistency and coincides with the core whenever the core is non-empty (Theorem 4). Finally, we comment on the difficulty in obtaining further positive results for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems in line with Sasaki's (1995) characterizations of the core for two-sided assignment problems. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] | |
| 653 | |a Studies | ||
| 653 | |a Assignment problem | ||
| 653 | |a Economic theory | ||
| 653 | |a Economic models | ||
| 653 | |a Tennis | ||
| 653 | |a Game theory | ||
| 653 | |a Tournaments & championships | ||
| 653 | |a Linear programming | ||
| 653 | |a Rationality | ||
| 653 | |a Theorems | ||
| 653 | |a Pareto optimum | ||
| 653 | |a Dummy | ||
| 653 | |a Assignment | ||
| 653 | |a Apathy | ||
| 653 | |a Property | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Nichifor, Alexandru | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Social Choice and Welfare |g vol. 35, no. 3 (Sep 2010), p. 415 | |
| 786 | 0 | |d ProQuest |t ABI/INFORM Global | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |3 Citation/Abstract |u https://www.proquest.com/docview/746322023/abstract/embedded/7BTGNMKEMPT1V9Z2?source=fedsrch |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |3 Full Text |u https://www.proquest.com/docview/746322023/fulltext/embedded/7BTGNMKEMPT1V9Z2?source=fedsrch |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |3 Full Text - PDF |u https://www.proquest.com/docview/746322023/fulltextPDF/embedded/7BTGNMKEMPT1V9Z2?source=fedsrch |