Deep Reinforcement Learning for Backup Strategies against Adversaries
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| 發表在: | arXiv.org (Feb 12, 2021), p. n/a |
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| 主要作者: | |
| 其他作者: | , |
| 出版: |
Cornell University Library, arXiv.org
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | Citation/Abstract Full text outside of ProQuest |
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| Resumen: | Many defensive measures in cyber security are still dominated by heuristics, catalogs of standard procedures, and best practices. Considering the case of data backup strategies, we aim towards mathematically modeling the underlying threat models and decision problems. By formulating backup strategies in the language of stochastic processes, we can translate the challenge of finding optimal defenses into a reinforcement learning problem. This enables us to train autonomous agents that learn to optimally support planning of defense processes. In particular, we tackle the problem of finding an optimal backup scheme in the following adversarial setting: Given \(k\) backup devices, the goal is to defend against an attacker who can infect data at one time but chooses to destroy or encrypt it at a later time, potentially also corrupting multiple backups made in between. In this setting, the usual round-robin scheme, which always replaces the oldest backup, is no longer optimal with respect to avoidable exposure. Thus, to find a defense strategy, we model the problem as a hybrid discrete-continuous action space Markov decision process and subsequently solve it using deep deterministic policy gradients. We show that the proposed algorithm can find storage device update schemes which match or exceed existing schemes with respect to various exposure metrics. |
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| ISSN: | 2331-8422 |
| Fuente: | Engineering Database |